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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) defines 
nuclear security as “All preventive measures taken to minimize 
the residual risk of unauthorised transfer of nuclear material 
and/or sabotage, which could lead to release of radioactivity 
and/or adverse impact on the safety of the plant, plant 
personnel, public and environment”. According to the AERB 
safety guidelines of December 2009, information on nuclear 
security entails aspects such as “physical protection system, 
physical barrier and communication”. The definition provided 
by the AERB falls in line with the broader rubric of nuclear 
security as agreed to by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). 
The operative phrase in the definition provided by the 
AERB is “All preventive measures”. The guidelines do 
provide for stringent physical security of nuclear facilities 
in India including the nuclear power plants, power projects, 
various fuel cycle facilities as well as other radiation facilities. 
According to the guidelines, the individual operators are 
responsible for the safety and security of the nuclear facility. 
The Central Industrial Reserve Force (CISF) is tasked with 
deploying trained first responders to the nuclear facility site. 
Each of these CISF teams is guided by a commandant and 
they are skilled and equipped to respond appropriately and 
proportionately in case of a nuclear emergency at the nuclear 
facility. Hence, the physical security parameters of a nuclear 
facility are clearly laid out. 
However, there are not sufficient security measures in 
place for transit security of the nuclear material. As far as the 
security of the front-end of the fuel cycle is concerned, there 
remain certain loopholes which can inadvertently encourage 
illicit nuclear proliferation activities. The front-end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle would imply accounting for the Uranium Ore 
concentrate that is extracted from the mining of the Uranium 
Ore and its transport (by land, air and sea) to the Conversion 
Plant before it reaches the enrichment and fabrication stages. 
These loopholes in the physical security stage of the nuclear 
power plant need to be addressed in order to pave way for 
preventing and by extension facilitating better and more 
effective implementation of the other two aspects of nuclear 
security architecture in India, that is border security and inter-
institutional coordination in case of a radiological emergency. 
The next section begins by laying out the current framework 
for physical security at nuclear power plants and the challenges 
that need to be addressed. 
2. SeCURITy Of The NUCleaR PlaNT: TRaNSIT, 
PhySICal aND CybeR DImeNSIONS
Depending on the level of radioactivity present, there are 
different levels of security-level 1, level 2 and level 3, that are 
in place for safe transport of Radioactive Material (RAM). 
The guidelines also provide for installation of hardware for 
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monitoring the movement of conveyances carrying RAM1. 
Currently the system employed for the accounting of the transit 
of nuclear material from the ore to the milling stage includes 
a Unique Identification Number (UID) allotted to the drums 
carrying the material, which is linked to the production lot 
number2. These drums are then transported to the conversion 
or fabrication plants. In case of any discrepancy in terms of 
the amount (weight) of material inside the drums, independent 
auditors are called in to conduct a review. The whole process of 
tracking the material leaving the mine is mostly done manually 
which increases the room for human error or complacency. The 
lack of a credible security infrastructure in the front-end phase 
of the nuclear cycle can give terror outfits an open space for 
theft of such material. Further, this material can then be sold by 
illegal intermediaries in black market, making the RAM readily 
available to whomsoever is willing to offer the right price.
To avoid these errors, blockchain technology can come 
handy for governing the transport of nuclear material, especially 
in the front-end phase of the fuel cycle which is currently not 
extensively covered by the national or international (IAEA) 
guidelines. A blockchain is essentially an online, peer-to-
peer, distributed ledger used for maintaining an account of 
different material/data set depending on the type of blockchain. 
Although, the most common usage of this technology was seen 
in context of Bitcoins (virtual currency), blockchain technology 
can be used in various other fields owing to the high degree 
of technological sophistication, precision and security that the 
system entails.
Each container/drum carrying RAM from the ore can be 
marked with a microchip which will give that container a unique 
digital identity containing all information like the nature of 
material inside the container, the weight, level of radioactivity, 
names of persons allotted to oversee smooth transportation of 
the container, the route to be taken for transporting the container 
from the place of origin to place of destination and so on. All 
the personnel having access to this digital identity will be able 
to track the movement of the container in real-time. Hence, any 
changes, like a diversion in the route of transportation or any 
discrepancies in weight etc can be tracked as it happens, hence 
not losing any time in taking appropriate action2. 
Similarly, a consortium of blockchains for nuclear 
material accounting can be created with the unique digital 
identity of each, drawing from the previous one so that any 
small, malicious activity aimed at breaking into the system will 
be caught in real-time.
This is not an entirely new concept as the AERB, in its 
guidelines, has suggested that an “automated and real time 
tracking methods should be deployed in order to permit the 
transport control centre to remotely monitor the movement 
of radioactive material conveyances and packages and their 
status”1.
Similarly, physical sabotage or accidents aren’t the only 
threat scenarios that exist. Another facet of physical security of 
the nuclear facility which is often ignored is a stringent cyber 
security infrastructure. It is possible for hackers to introduce a 
malware into the functioning systems inside the nuclear facility 
and make the instruments or reactors malfunction or shut 
them down entirely. This was observed during a cyber-attack 
at a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia wherein a malware 
called ‘Triton’ was introduced into the critical systems of the 
industrial infrastructure of the plant in 2017. 
Another instance of using cyberspace to target security 
systems at a nuclear facility was in 2010 when a malware 
called ‘Stuxnet’ caused hundreds of centrifuges at an Iranian 
nuclear plant to function out of control and destroy themselves3. 
Specifically, in India’s case, certain reports surfaced some time 
back, concerning the Uranium enrichment plant at Rattehalli 
near Mysore being compromised due to its critical infrastructure 
being exposed to the ‘Stuxnet’ malware. More recently, India’s 
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) was attacked by 
a ‘dtrack’ malware in September 2019, that affected the plant’s 
administrative network4. 
The seriousness of a cyber security attack can be gauged 
from the fact that since at nuclear plants, the nuclear generators, 
once installed with fuel, run for a couple of years at a stretch, 
any disruption can cause the reactor to shut down leading to 
melting of the reactor core. Although such errors could be a 
result of human complacency, operator errors or the system 
malfunction as was seen in the Three-Mile Island crisis, a 
malware can replicate the same errors with risks almost ten 
folds and cause a reactor to melt5. 
Currently, the point entity for handling cyber security 
at nuclear facilities in India is Computer and Information 
Security Advisory group (CISAg) and the Task Force for 
Instrumentation and Control Security (TAFICS).
Despite having serious repercussions for the security of 
critical infrastructure like nuclear facilities, there is no mention 
of management of cybersecurity threats in the National Disaster 
Management guidelines on ‘Management of Nuclear and 
Radiological Emergencies’6. 
The AERB D-257 and D-108 safety guide released in 2003 
and 2005 respectively provide a manual for computer-based 
safety systems of PHWR. The guide mentions the security 
requirements to be met by instrumentation and control systems 
(I&C) at nuclear power plants, like tamper-proof event logs, 
sanitisation of pre-developed software and so on. However, 
these guidelines need to be updated to account for the new 
kinds of cyber security threats that have emerged ever since. 
To address this very issue, BARC, in 2010, came out with a 
special issue on I&C security for nuclear power plants where 
based on the AERB and international I&C security guidelines, 
the article featured a system specific plan for evading I&C 
related threats9.
One of the more recent 2014 BARC special issue gave 
a detailed view on secure network access systems (SNAS), 
India’s only integrated network security solution10. More 
recently, a 2017 query raised in Rajya Sabha on possible cyber 
security threats to nuclear facilities attracted response from the 
government on how safe and secure the nuclear facilities are 
in India11. However, there was no detailed mention on how the 
new kinds/nature of cyber security threats emerging in present 
times is being dealt with by the government. 
Adopting new measures like the upcoming Shared 
Ledger-SAFKA12 “informed by Finland’s nuclear material 
database (SAFKA) and co-developed with Stimson Centre for 
the safety of nuclear material in the front and back-end phase 
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of the nuclear cycle is absolutely imperative especially when, 
India ranks 19th in the “theft rankings’ out of 22 countries with 
weapons-usable nuclear material13. Although India is party to 
the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM) and has ratified the 2005 amendment as well14, there 
is still scope for improvement.  
3. TRaININg Of PeRSONNel aND aCCeSS 
TO RaDIaTION DeTeCTION eqUIPmeNT
The second most important aspect of preventing illicit 
trafficking of nuclear material is a stringent radiation detection 
law enforcement which includes proper training of personnel 
deployed not only at the nuclear facilities but also at ports 
and borders as well as capacity building in terms of providing 
appropriate instruments for radiation detection. 
The IPCS workshop on Smuggling and Radiation 
Detection held in June 2019 highlighted all the major instances 
of nuclear smuggling witnessed in India including- a uranium 
smuggling racket in 1992 which was busted by Kolkata police, 
seizure of 100 kg of uranium in 1998 by the West Bengal police, 
theft of a container in 2006 from a research facility in Eastern 
India which was never found and the 2016 arrests made by 
Thane police for possession of radioactive uranium.
There exist systemic vulnerabilities which have been 
exploited several times in the past and continue to expose 
nuclear facilities to acts of nuclear terrorism. For example, 
the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which is mainly 
tasked with guarding the nuclear facilities is not sufficiently 
equipped with spotting instances of smuggling of nuclear 
material in and out of the facility. This is because all nuclear 
facilities have different security systems. While some facilities 
are solely guarded by the CISF, there are others like the Heavy 
Water Plant in Hazira which is guarded by security personnel of 
Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd (KRIBHCO) in collaboration 
with the state Police personnel, and Institute of Plasma 
Research (IPR) at gandhi Nagar which is guarded by private 
security personnel. Therefore, there is an absence of a unified 
and standardised security apparatus across the country15. 
Similarly, India’s porous borders with countries like 
Nepal, Bangladesh and so on further allow for free movement 
of material of any nature across the border. Almost all cargo 
entry points in India-be it air, water or land are supposed to 
be installed with radiation detection equipment. Additionally, 
all personnel are provided with and trained in using handheld 
mobile radiation detection systems. To further enhance 
airport security against illicit smuggling of nuclear material, 
a radiological mock drill was conducted at Rajiv gandhi 
Hyderabad International Airport in 201716. This was followed 
by a training programme conducted by NDMA in 2018 at 
the Indira gandhi International Airport (IgI), New Delhi 
for preparedness for CBRN emergencies17. Similar training 
programme was conducted at the New Mangalore Port 
Trust, Mangaluru and a mock drill at a mall in Vijayawada in 
2019 to enable Seaport Emergency Handlers (SEH) and the 
NDRF officials respectively to handle threats emanating from 
CBRN-related emergency18. However, there remains certain 
gaps in implementation and a lot more needs to be done for 
sensitisation and standardised training of personnel across 
the country tasked with prevention and mitigation of acts of 
nuclear terrorism. 
In addition to that, the disaster response mechanism for 
CBRN-related emergencies needs to be strengthened many 
folds. There is a wide scope for updating the training modules 
and frequency of training of stakeholders including the National 
Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and National 
Disaster Response Force (NDRF) team along with training 
of Border Security Forces (BSF), Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF), CISF and Indo-Tibetan Border Policy (ITBP), 
especially in cases of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) emergencies. For instance, between 2006 to 
2015, out of 291 mock exercises, the NDMA conduced only 7 
mock exercises for off-site Nuclear and Radiological Disaster 
where 6 exercises took place in 2011 and 1 mock exercise in 
201319. Similarly, from 2015 to 2016, only one mock exercise 
on CBRN disaster was conducted while the mock drills from 
2016 to 2018 have no mention on the nature of mock exercises 
that were conducted20. There is no specific mention of the 2019 
calendar for mock drills by the NDMA. Additionally, although 
large number of hospitals across India have been prepared to 
treat CBRN casualties, according to latest updates by BARC, 
there are no hospitals exclusively designated for handling 
CBRN disasters21. The slow pace of development in the area 
is evident from the fact that there has only been a marginal 
increase in number of Emergency Response Centres (ERC) in 
India from 18 in 2009 to 25 in 201922.
There is definitely a growing awareness for the need of 
training workshops for tackling CBRN-related emergencies. 
For example, in 2015-2016, specialised training and advanced 
courses and workshops were conducted for the NDRF 
battalion personnel in CBRN operations at the North Eastern 
Police Academy (NEPA) and Bhabha Atomic Research 
Centre (BARC)23. Similarly, in 2017, workshop on medical 
management of CBRN casualties for medical officers was held 
in New Delhi and BARC, Mumbai16. The recently proposed 
2019 annual training calendar by the NDRF mentions refresher 
courses CBRN emergencies for the NDRF battalion including 
First Responders24. 
Management, prevention, mitigation and preparedness 
for CBRN disasters has been incorporated into the training 
curriculum on capacity building by NDMA for not only NDRF 
personnel but also the Indian Police and Army personnel as they 
are equal stakeholders during a radiological emergency25. Apart 
from the NDMA, the Ministry of Defense also runs a CBRN 
training curriculum which is especially designed to “assist the 
Armed Forces Medical Services (AFMS), an inter-services 
organisation, to improve its emergency preparedness”26. 
According to reports, these trainings are supposed to be 
conducted periodically at the command, corps and division 
level. However, the course details on capacity building have 
not been updated online. Relevant and up-to-date information 
on such training modules is necessary to suggest measures that 
can be taken to improve upon such courses to tackle the new 
kinds of threats that are emerging within the CBRN domain. 
Therefore, measures like effective coordination and 
integration of civil and military training for CBRN disasters, 
standardised (and customised where needed) training manual for 
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concerned personnel to deal with such emergencies, modelling 
national emergency response mechanisms after international 
standards and increasing the frequency and quality of training 
and simulation exercises, with sufficient access to radiation 
detection equipment for handling radiological emergencies 
at the border as well as at major public events (MPE) can 
substantially enhance India’s level of preparedness.
4. effeCTIve CeNTRe-STaTe 
COORDINaTION 
Last but not the least, the third essential element of 
strengthening the nuclear security and disaster management 
circuit includes strong, credible and effective coordination 
mechanism between the centre and state authorities responsible 
for dealing with a possible radiological disaster. 
The Department of Atomic Energy is the nodal technical 
agency for handling a nuclear/radiological disaster especially in 
the public domain like a major public event. While the NDMA 
and NDRF work on the centre level to mitigate the risks, 
state and district authorities like State Disaster Management 
Authority (SDMA) and District Disaster Management 
Authority (DDMA) work in close coordination with the central 
authorities and various other stakeholders in a nuclear crisis. 
However, there is a need to institute and most importantly, 
implement clear Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) in case 
of a radiological emergency. Lack of proper SOPs to handle 
a nuclear crisis in major public events like a cricket match 
was pointed out in the 2019 IPCS workshop on Smuggling 
and Radiation Detection as well. According to the findings, 
radiation detection for MPE only began roughly two years ago, 
that too for VIPs.
The NDMA, in its guidelines clearly mention the need the 
strengthen the formal linkages and coordination mechanisms 
between DAE, Crisis Management groups (CMg), ERCs 
and the state and district level authorities in an event of a 
radiological emergency. This needs to be complemented with 
appropriate intra-state coordination between the SDMA, the 
DDMA and the nearest NDRF battalion deployed for dealing 
with such emergency situations6. 
While all states have a state disaster management plan in 
place, it is highly imperative that the State Disaster Response 
Force (SDRF) in every state is well equipped and trained in 
radiological emergency management. Currently, there is no 
such exclusive CBRN training included in the mock drills that 
is conducted by the SDMAs and hence it needs to be instituted 
for smooth and uninterrupted coordination between the district, 
state and centre authorities. 
5. beST PRaCTICeS
While there is still a long way to go before blockchain 
technology can be incorporated into the nuclear security 
architecture of countries, some major advancements have 
been made in key areas of nuclear security, addressing some 
of the challenges raised above. Australia is one such country 
which has performed consistently, ranking first in the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI) index on nuclear theft and security 
since 2012. This includes stringent on-site physical protection, 
comprehensive measures for prevention of insider threat, 
controlled oversight of nuclear material transport and its 
frequency and so on. 
Regular training and simulation exercises form a core 
component of Australia’s nuclear security strategy. In addition 
to conducting national-level exercises and training course on 
enhancing radiation emergency response capability, Australia 
has actively collaborated with international organisations such 
as IAEA, WHO and FNCA (Forum for Nuclear Cooperation 
in Asia) on operational, tactical and command level to 
enhance interoperability across all jurisdictions28-29. One of 
the noteworthy features of Australia’s nuclear security regime 
is the robust inter-agency coordination between ARPANSA 
(Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency) 
and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
for border control enhancements for import and export of 
radioactive material across the border28. 
Australia invited the IAEA International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) in 2017 for a follow-up 
mission the progress on the country’s nuclear security systems. 
In the final mission report, the IPPAS appreciated 5 best 
practices including periodic safety review process of research 
reactors, “no alone zone” function of the Electronic Access 
Control System to protect against insider threat, regular surveys 
across industries to update the information security manual for 
assessing new threat information and so on30. Australia has 
further improved its nuclear security with periodic updates 
of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and instituting a “cyber-
incident response plan” at nuclear sites31.
As far as physical safety of the nuclear sites is concerned, 
UK has a special branch of police called Civil Nuclear 
Constabulary (CNC) to guard those nuclear material and 
facilities that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the armed 
forces30 unlike India’s CISF which is tasked with guarding 
industrial units and critical infrastructures across the board. 
Additionally, France has a Specialized Platoons Protection 
Police (PSPG) which is a “unified command and training 
structure to ensure high levels of interoperability between 
these forces in the time of a crisis”32.
6. CONClUSIONS
The three-fold nuclear security architecture as mentioned 
in the paper highlights the progress that has been made so far as 
well as the lacuna in the current discourse on nuclear security 
in India. Incidentally, most of the areas of improvement as 
mentioned in the paper and underscored at the 2019 IPCS 
workshop on Smuggling and Radiation Detection are the 
same issues mentioned in the 2009 NDMA guidelines on 
“Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies”. 
This shows that in the last one decade, while steps have been 
taken by the government to improve upon the structural and 
technological weaknesses, there is still a wide scope of further 
improvement in the nuclear security domain. Selected practices 
of other countries in the domain could serve as a guiding path 
for further improvement. These practices would obviously 
have to be re-modelled to suit India’s special security needs, 
socio-cultural environment and geostrategic concerns.
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